Abstract. We introduce a justification logic with a novel constructor for evidence terms, according to which the new information itself serves as evidence for believing it. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for belief expansion and minimal change and explain how the minimality can be graded according to the strength of reasoning. We also provide an evidential analog of the Ramsey axiom.
Introduction
Like modal logics, justification logics are epistemic logics that provide means to formalize properties of knowledge and belief. Modal logics use formulas A to state that A is known (or believed), where the modality can be seen as an implicit knowledge operator since it does not provide any reason why A is known. Justification logics operate with explicit evidence for an agent's knowledge using formulas of the form t : A to state that A is known for reason t. The evidence term t may represent a formal mathematical proof of A or an informal reason for believing A such as a public announcement or direct observation of A.
Artemov developed the first justification logic, the Logic of Proofs, to give a classical provability semantics for intuitionistic logic [2] [3] [4] . In the area of formal epistemology, justification logics provide a novel approach to certain epistemic puzzles and problems of multiagent systems [5-7, 9, 13] .
The study of dynamic justification logics took off with Renne's PhD thesis [21] and his work on eliminating unreliable evidence [22] . He also investigated the expressive power of certain justification logics with announcements [23] . In a series of papers [12, 14, 15] we examined two alternative justification counterparts of Gerbrandy-Groeneveld's public announcement logic [18] . Last but not least, Baltag et al. [10] introduced a justification logic for belief change, soft evidence, and defeasible knowledge.
In the present paper we introduce the justification logic JUP CS that provides a sound and complete axiomatization for belief expansion and minimal change. Our logic includes a new evidence term construct up(A) that represents the update with A. Hence, after an update with A, the term up(A) becomes a reason to believe A. Formally, this is modeled by the axiom [A] up(A) : A .
In addition, the presence of explicit evidence makes it possible to axiomatize the principle of minimal change within the object language. For instance, in Lemma 20 we prove Supported by Swiss National Science Foundation grant PZ00P2-131706.
that for each term t that does not contain up(A) as a subterm,
The direction from left to right is the persistence principle saying that we deal only with belief expansion. The direction from right to left states that if after an update with A an agent believes B for a reason that is independent from the update, then before the update the agent already believed B for the same reason. Note that a principle of this kind cannot be formulated in a purely modal logic language. When [A] B holds, it is not clear whether B should be the case since it is not known whether the belief in B depends on the update or is due to another, unrelated reason.
The Logic JUP CS
We start with countably many constants c i , countably many variables x i , and countably many atomic propositions P i . The (evidence) terms and formulas of the language of JUP are defined as follows:
-Evidence terms.
• Every constant c i and every variable x i is an atomic term. If A is a formula, then up(A) is an atomic term. Every atomic term is a term.
• If t and s are terms and A is a formula, then (t · A s) is a term.
-Formulas.
• Every atomic proposition P i is a formula.
• If A and B are formulas, Γ is a finite set of formulas, and t is a term, then ¬A, ATm, Prop, Tm, and Fml denote the set of atomic terms, the set of atomic propositions, the set of evidence terms, and the set of formulas respectively. A formula t : A means that A is believed for reason t and [Γ ]A stands for A holds after an update with all formulas in Γ . As usual, we define (A ∧ B) := ¬(A → ¬B) and (A ↔ B) := ((A → B) ∧ (B → A)). We employ the standard conventions on the omission of brackets and postulate that both the colon operator in t : A and the update operator in [Γ ]A bind stronger than any Boolean connective.
The set of axioms of JUP can be found in Fig. 1 . Note that Γ ∪ ∆ in the axiom (It) is a finite set of formulas whenever Γ and ∆ are. The axioms (Taut) and (App) become the usual axioms of the justification logic J (see [6] ) if (App) is formulated as an implication instead of the equivalence above. The present version with the equivalence yields a justification logics with minimal evidence. Later, when we define the semantics, this will correspond to the fact that the evidence relation is the least fixed point. This also explains why we need to annotate the application operator · by a formula: otherwise we would not be able to formulate the direction from right to left. Renne [22] was the first to use this 1. all claims that updates are introspectively successful : after an update with a formula A, the agent believes A and the term up(A) represents a reason for that belief, which is the update itself. The axiom (Init) postulates the special status of terms up(A), which initially, i.e., before any updates, cannot serve as a basis for belief in anything. Axioms (MC.1) and (MC.2) formalize the principle of minimal change: an update should only lead to the smallest necessary change in the belief set. That means only those beliefs should be added that "logically" follow from the update and from what is already believed before. An interesting feature of our system is that the strength of the logic used for the deductive closure can be regulated. Finally, axiom (It) explains how to deal with iterated updates. A constant specification CS (for JUP) is any subset
. . , c n are constants, and A is an axiom of JUP}.
For a constant specification CS the deductive system JUP CS is the Hilbert system given by the axioms of JUP and by the rules modus ponens and axiom necessitation:
We write JUP CS A if the formula A is derivable in JUP CS .
We are now going to introduce a semantics for JUP CS that uses basic modular models. Artemov [8] introduced them for the basic justification logic J in order to provide an ontologically transparent semantics for justifications. Kuznets and Studer [19] later extended this construction to all justification counterparts of the logics from the modal cube between K and S5. The very first semantics of this kind, however, was presented by Mkrtychev [20] .
Note that cl B is a monotone operator on Tm × Fml, that is
for all X, Y ⊆ Tm × Fml. Hence, cl B has a least fixed point, which is shown as usual, see, e.g., [11] .
Lemma 2 (Least fixed point).
There is a unique R ⊆ Tm × Fml such that
we know that C is non-empty. Let R := C. The second claim now holds by definition. And the uniqueness of R is an easy corollary of the second claim.
It remains to establish cl B (R) = R . Let S ∈ C. Since R ⊆ S and cl B is monotone, we find cl B (R) ⊆ cl B (S). We also have cl B (S) ⊆ S, so cl B (R) ⊆ S. Since S is an arbitrary element of C and R = C, this implies cl B (R) ⊆ R.
To show R ⊆ cl B (R), we first observe that since cl B (R) ⊆ R, we have cl B (cl B (R)) ⊆ cl B (R) by monotonicity. Thus cl B (R) ∈ C, which gives us R ⊆ cl B (R) because R = C.
Definition 3 (Evidence relation).
Let B ⊆ ATm×Fml. We define the minimal evidence relation E(B) as the least fixed point of cl B .
It follows directly from the definition of cl B that Lemma 4 (Properties of fixed points of cl B ). For any B ⊆ ATm × Fml and any fixed point F of cl B , e.g., for F = E(B):
Further, we get the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (Monotonicity of E). Let B, C ⊆ ATm × Fml. We have that E(B) ⊆ E(B ∪ C).
Proof. By induction on t we show (t, A) ∈ E(B) implies (t, A) ∈ E(B ∪C) for all formulas A. Assume (t, A) ∈ E(B). We have one of the following cases. Remark 7. Note that our definition of a model update is independent of which formulas are true, unlike Plaza-style, Gerbrandy-Groeneveld-style, or action model-style updates, where the definitions of model update and truth in the model have to be given by simultaneous induction. This ontological separation of reasons for belief from truth is inherent in Artemov's semantics of modular models [8] , which we adopt and adapt in this paper.
Lemma 8 (Properties of updated models).
For any constant specification CS, any CS-model M, and any finite set Γ of formulas, the model M Γ is a CS-model.
Proof. Immediately follows from
Definition 9 (Truth). Let M = (v, B) be a model and D be a formula. We define the relation M D by
A formula D is valid with respect to a constant specification CS if M D for all initial CS-models M.
Soundness
For this section and the next one, we assume CS to be a fixed but arbitrary constant specification. In later sections, the use of soundness and completeness with respect to models with no CS specified should be understood as soundness and completeness with respect to initial ∅-models because any model is an ∅-model.
Theorem 10 (Soundness). For all formulas D,
JUP CS D implies D is valid with respect to CS .
Proof.
As usual the proof is by induction on the length of the derivation of D. Let M = (v, B) be an initial CS-model. Since t ∈ ATm, we get (t, A) ∈ B Γ = B ∪ U Γ by Lemma 4.1. Clearly, (t, A) / ∈ U Γ . Hence, (t, A) ∈ B, and (t, A) ∈ E(B) by Lemma 4.1. Therefore, we conclude that M t : A.
(Taut). All instances of propositional tautologies hold under M.

(App). M t : (A → B) ∧ s : A iff {(t, A → B), (s, A)} ⊆ E(B). By Lemma 4.2, this is equivalent to (t · A s, B) ∈ E(B), in other words to
M t · A s : B. 3. (Red.1). M [Γ ]P iff M Γ P iff P ∈ v iff M P . 4. (Red.2). M [Γ ]¬B iff M Γ ¬B iff M Γ B iff M [Γ ]B iff M ¬[Γ ]B.
(MC.2). Similar to Case 2 but for
M Γ . 11. (It). M [Γ ][∆]A iff M Γ [∆]A iff (M Γ ) ∆ A. By Lemma 8, (M Γ ) ∆ = M Γ ∪∆ . Thus, the equivalence continues as M Γ ∪∆ A iff M [Γ ∪ ∆]A.
(MP).
It is trivial to see that modus ponens preserves truth in a model. 
(AN). For any (c, B) ∈ CS, we have (c,
B
Completeness
Definition 11 (Consistency). A set Φ of formulas, finite or infinite, is called consistent
A set Φ is called maximal consistent if it is consistent whereas no proper superset of Φ is.
Definition 12 (Induced model). Let Φ be a maximal consistent set of formulas. The model M Φ = (v Φ , B Φ ) that is induced by Φ is given by Lemma 13 (Canonical evidence). Let Φ be a maximal consistent set. Then 
Theorem 17 (Completeness). For all formulas D,
D is valid with respect to CS implies JUP CS D .
Proof. Assume JUP CS D. Then {¬D} is consistent and, hence, contained in a maximal consistent set Φ. By the previous lemma we find M Φ ¬D. Thus, we conclude M Φ D, which means that D is not valid with respect to CS since M Φ is an initial CS-model.
We now show that the update with the empty set Γ = ∅, i.e., the update with no additional information, has no effect. We show the following principle of minimal change: an update with A has no effect on beliefs that are justified without reference to that update. 1 . t ∈ ATm. Then, (t, B) ∈ B Γ = B ∪{(up(A), A) | A ∈ Γ } by Lemma 4.1. Since t = up(A) for any A ∈ Γ , we find (t, B) ∈ B. Thus, (t, B) ∈ E(B) by Lemma 4.1, and M t : B follows. (C → B) by (MC.2) and soundness. By IH we find M s : C ∧ r : (C → B) . Thus, we conclude by (App) and soundness that M t : B.
The claim follows by completeness.
AGM Postulates
In the now classic paper [1] , Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson introduced their famous postulates for belief contraction and revision where the underlying principle is that of minimal change. Later Gärdenfors [17] added postulates for belief expansion. We are going to show that the update operator of JUP CS satisfies these postulates for expansion, see Lemma 27. Before we can state and prove Gärdenfors's postulates, we need to introduce the notion of a belief set and of the belief set induced by a model.
Definition 21 (Belief set).
A belief set is a set X ⊆ Fml of formulas that satisfies if A ∈ X and A → B ∈ X, then B ∈ X. 
Ramsey Axiom
The Ramsey axiom makes it possible to express the beliefs after an update in terms of the beliefs before the update. In dynamic doxastic logic, for example, Segerberg [24] formulates the Ramsey axiom as
Thus, it states that an agent believes B after an update with A if and only if the agent believes that A implies B before the update. We can establish an explicit analog of the Ramsey axiom in JUP CS for propositionally appropriate constant specifications.
We have to show the two implications of the Ramsey axiom separately. First, the direction from right to left. For a propositionally appropriate constant specification, we do have an explicit version of the direction from left to right.
Lemma 29 (Ramsey I). JUP CS
Lemma 30 (Ramsey II). Let CS be a propositionally appropriate constant specification. For each term t there exists a term s such that
Proof. Let M be an initial CS-model with M [A]t : B. By induction on the structure of t we show M s : (A → B) for some s, then (4) follows by completeness. We distinguish the following cases for t:
There are two possibilities: -t = up(B) or A = B. By the axiom of minimal change (MC.1) we find M t : B.
Since CS is propositionally appropriate, there exists a constant c such that M c : (B → (A → B) ). Hence, we conclude M c · B t : (A → B). Thus, we find M (c · A→(C→B) r ) · A→C s : (A → B).
Conclusion
We have introduced JUP CS , a justification logic for belief expansion. The explicit evidence terms in JUP CS keep track of the effect an update has on an agent's beliefs, which makes it possible to axiomatize in the object language the principle of minimal change and establish soundness and completeness.
There are two directions of further research. One is to study belief contraction and revision in the context of justification logic. This is closely related to [22] where evidence elimination is studied.
A second line of research is to consider introspective agents. It is straightforward to add positive introspection to JUP CS since semantically this corresponds to a positive operator and, therefore, the least fixed point construction of the evidence relation still works. However, he properties with respect to belief sets and the Ramsey axiom will be different and, not surprisingly, the Moore's paradox will reappear. Adding negative introspection is also possible. The non-monotone inductive definitions used in the model constructions [25] for negative introspection provide a short preview of its belief dynamics.
